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SHOULD WE DISCRIMINATE AMONG DISCRIMINATIONS?
TENEILLE R. BROWN,* LESLIE P. FRANCIS** & JAMES TABERY***
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the complexities of rationing
needed health care in a pandemic. It has also revealed deep, structural
inequities in health care systems and societies, with certain disadvantaged
groups experiencing alarmingly disproportionate rates of infection. A number
of anti-discrimination statutes exist to ameliorate some of these historical
inequities in the United States. Under federal law, health care facilities
receiving federal funding may not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or
national origin; disability; age; or sex. Three of these forms of discrimination
were already prohibited by statutes that have been in effect for nearly fifty years:
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (race, color, and national origin), the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (disability), and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975
(age). In 2010, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) referenced these
three statutes and a fourth, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (sex),
in a prohibition of all of these forms of discrimination by health care facilities
receiving federal funding.
Substantially different bodies of case law have been developed for each
statute, spanning the fifty years these statutes have been in effect. The ACA’s
juxtaposition of the four presents a puzzle with profound legal, policy, social,
and ethical implications: Does Section 1557 bring these four anti-discrimination
statutes together in order to harmonize them, offering a common approach to
anti-discrimination in health care for all categories? Or should there continue
to be differences among how discrimination is understood for these different
protected categories? Using the examples of crisis care standards and vaccine
allocation, this Article explores this puzzle in interpreting Section 1557. To do
so, this Article details important differences among the statutes, including their
approach to disparate impact discrimination and whether they have been
* Teneille R. Brown, JD, is a Professor of Law at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of
Law.
** Leslie P. Francis, JD, PhD, is the Distinguished Alfred C. Emery Professor of Law and
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at University of Utah.
*** James Tabery, MA, PhD, is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. We are grateful
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interpreted to permit suits by private individuals for damages. This Article also
explores the legislative histories of the Age Discrimination Act and the ACA
itself. This Article concludes that Section 1557 reveals but does not resolve
important questions about whether there are legally relevant reasons to
discriminate among discriminations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed deep, structural inequities in our
health care systems and society, with certain disadvantaged groups experiencing
alarmingly disproportionate rates of infection, hospitalization, and death. 1
Thankfully, a number of federal anti-discrimination statutes exist to ameliorate
some of these historical inequities. The statutes respond to different types of
discrimination and have generated diverse bodies of case law. While these
statutes prohibit discrimination in places like education, employment, and
housing, for decades there were gaps remaining.
In 2010, Congress sought to address one of these gaps in Section 1557 of
the ACA (Section 1557), which prohibits discrimination in health care programs
and activities that receive federal funds. 2 Rather than creating new protected
classes of individuals, Section 1557 incorporates the protected classes from four
pre-existing civil rights statutes. These statutes are: Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VI), which protects against discrimination on the basis of
race, color, and national origin in federally funded programs; 3 Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), which protects against
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs receiving federal
funding; 4 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), which
protects against discrimination on the basis of disability in federally funded
programs; 5 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (Age Act), which protects
against discrimination on the basis of age in federally funded programs. 6
When referencing these four statutes, Section 1557 states that it prohibits
discrimination “on the ground prohibited under” and then lists each statute. 7
This use of the singular “ground” creates a puzzle: Does Section 1557 simply
refer to each of the statutes separately, incorporating the separate statutory
language and case law that has developed with respect to each of the four? Or
does Section 1557 create an anti-discrimination standard in federally funded
health care that is, to at least some extent, uniform across these categories?
The difference between “disparate treatment” and “disparate impact”
discrimination illustrates the importance of answering this question about the
interpretation of Section 1557. Disparate treatment involves intentional
discrimination against disadvantaged people in protected groups, while disparate
1. Leonard E. Egede & Rebekah J. Walker, Structural Racism, Social Risk Factors, and
Covid-19 — A Dangerous Convergence for Black Americans, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. e77(1), e77(2)
(2020); Sravani Singu et al., Impact of Social Determinants of Health on the Emerging COVID-19
Pandemic in the United States, FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH, July 2020, at 1, 5.
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116.
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
4. Title IX of The Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
5. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
6. Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6102.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (emphasis added).
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impact involves discriminatory outcomes, even if unintentional. 8 To illustrate
this point, consider a policy that locates COVID-19 testing centers in areas of a
city that are predominantly inhabited by White people and that cannot readily be
accessed by public transit. If the decision was made intentionally to make it more
difficult for communities of color to access the testing centers, then it would
amount to disparate treatment. On the other hand, if the decision was made
without any consideration of race, and yet still disproportionately affected the
ability of people of color to successfully receive testing, then it could amount to
disparate impact. 9 The disparate impact would be discriminatory if other
approaches to locating test centers were reasonably available and there were no
overriding justifications for the location of the centers. While all of the four
referenced statutes prohibit disparate treatment discrimination, the extent to
which disparate impact discrimination claims are permitted under these statutes
is unresolved. 10 As a result, controversies have emerged about whether Section
1557 endorses disparate impact discrimination claims for all the classes it
incorporates by reference or defers to case law under each of the four referenced
statutes on this question.
The interpretation of Section 1557 is legally contested. The rulemaking
completed by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the
Obama administration adopted a standard that would permit individuals to bring
claims for all of the protected categories based upon disparate impact
discrimination. 11 However, the final rule promulgated by the Trump
administration’s HHS rejected this uniformity. 12 Instead, it defers to the four,
separate, referenced statutes on this point, supposedly to eliminate redundancy
and “to align it more closely with the statutory text.” 13 Courts, for their part,

8. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (explaining the difference between disparate
treatment and disparate impact as forms of discrimination prohibited under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act).
9. Racial disparities in availability of COVID-19 testing were identified by reporters early in
the pandemic. See, e.g., Soo Rin Kim et al., Which Cities Have the Biggest Racial Gaps in COVID19 Testing Access?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 22, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/whiteneighborhoods-have-more-access-to-covid-19-testing-sites/ (identifying problems with access to
testing in Black and Hispanic neighborhoods).
10. See infra Section III.A.
11. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376,
31,440 (May 18, 2016) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 92).
12. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of
Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,162 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 438, 440,
460; 45 C.F.R. pt. 86, 92, 147, 155, 156).
13. Id.
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have also been divided on how to interpret the statute. 14 In May 2021, the Biden
administration announced plans to reassess the Section 1557 regulations. 15
These interpretive distinctions have real-world consequences. A few
examples come into sharp relief in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, as
many health care prioritization policies have been developed by programs that
accept federal funds. Consider the following examples from vaccine allocation
programs and care referrals.
A.

Vaccine Allocation

People who live in congregate settings such as long-term care (LTC)
facilities or prisons are at far greater risk of COVID-19 exposure than people
who live in single-family homes. 16 This is because they share air ventilation
systems, staff, and communal eating environments. 17 Indeed, the infection and
mortality rates among people living in these settings are several times higher
than the national average. 18 Most vaccine allocation decisions prioritize nursing
home residents on this basis. 19 The prioritization of prisoners has been much
more politically charged. 20 Nursing home residents in the United States are
77.9% White, 5.3% Hispanic or Latino, 14.2% Black, and 1.7% Asian. 21 In state
prisons, by contrast, 35% are White, 38% are Black, and 21% are Hispanic or

14. See, e.g., Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield, 926 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2019); Schmitt v.
Kaiser, 965 F.3d 945, 953, 954 (9th Cir. 2020).
15. Joint Status Report at 2–3, Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum.
Servs., No. 20-5331 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 2021). See also MaryBeth Musumeci et al., Recent and
Anticipated Actions to Reverse Trump Administration Section 1557 Non-Discrimination, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (June 9, 2021), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief
/recent-and-anticipated-actions-to-reverse-trump-administration-section-1557-non-discrimina
tion-rules/.
16. See Beth Schwartzapfel et al., 1 in 5 Prisoners in the U.S. Has Had COVID-19, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/12/18
/1-in-5-prisoners-in-the-u-s-has-had-covid-19.
17. Id.
18. See Priya Chidambaram et al., COVID-19 Has Claimed the Lives of 100,000 Long-Term Care
Residents and Staff, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/covid19-has-claimed-the-lives-of-100000-long-term-care-residents-and-staff/; see also Schwartzapfel et
al., supra note 16.
19. Larry Levitt et al., Estimates of the Initial Priority Population for COVID-19 Vaccination
by State, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issuebrief/estimates-of-the-initial-priority-population-for-covid-19-vaccination-by-state/.
20. Isaac Stanley-Becker, Early Vaccination in Prisons, a Public Health Priority, Proves
Politically Charged, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2021, 4:30 PM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/health
/2021/01/02/covid-vaccine-prisons/.
21. Share of Nursing Home Residents U.S. 2014, by Ethnicity, STATISTA, https://www.statista
.com/statistics/717618/percent-of-nursing-home-residents-in-us-by-ethnicity/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2021).
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Latino. 22 The decision to allocate vaccines to nursing homes before prisons will
have a disparate impact by race, even if that was not the intention. If disparate
impact claims are not available in this kind of situation, predictable racial
disparities such as this cannot be addressed through federal anti-discrimination
law.
B.

Care Referrals

People in nursing homes have been disproportionately impacted by COVID19. 23 According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, forty percent of all COVID19 deaths have been among LTC facility residents and staff. 24 There may be
many reasons for this difference, including the preferences of patients or family
members or concerns that the residents are too frail to be transferred. However,
more sinister forms of rationing may also be occurring if overcrowded hospitals
express reluctance to take patients from nursing homes, patients are diagnosed
later in the disease course, facilities caring for older patients face equipment
shortages, or nursing homes are reluctant to transfer patients to other facilities
for ageist or financial reasons. 25 These are all forms of “soft rationing,” in that
they do not explicitly apply a formal standard or rubric, but nonetheless
adversely affect individuals’ access to care as a result of their age. 26 Very high
percentages of residents of LTC facilities are elderly (eighty-five percent over
sixty-five, forty-three percent over eighty-five). 27 Over seventy percent of LTC
22. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENT’G PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 4 (2016). The percentages in the general population, by contrast, are
60.1% non-Hispanic White, 18.5% Hispanic and Latino, and 13.4% Black or African American.
Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table
/US/PST045219.
23. See Chidambaram et al., supra note 18.
24. Id.
25. The surge in Los Angeles may have resulted in these forms of soft rationing. See, e.g.,
Rong-Gong Lin II et al., Ambulance Crews Told Not to Transport Patients Who Have Little Chance
of Survival, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2021, 4:57 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/202101-04/los-angeles-hospitals-cannot-keep-up-covid-19-surge-illness; see also Catherine R. Butler et
al., US Clinicians’ Experiences and Perspectives on Resource Limitation and Patient Care During
the COVID-19 Pandemic, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Nov. 6, 2020, at 6, 8, doi:10.1001/jamanet
workopen.2020.27315 (describing physicians’ experiences with rationing care due to equipment
shortages during COVID-19); Timothy R. Farrell et al., Rationing Limited Healthcare Resources
in the COVID-19 Era and Beyond: Ethical Considerations Regarding Older Adults, 68 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1143, 1145 (2020) (criticizing age rationing during COVID-19); Teneille R.
Brown, Leslie P. Francis, & James Tabery, When Is Age Choosing Ageist Discrimination?, 51
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 13 (2021).
26. See Julia Belluz, No ICU Beds? Expect Double the Number of Covid-19 Deaths., VOX
(Jan. 13, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2021/1/13/22224445/covid-19-deaths-in-us-hospi
tal-beds-icu.
27. LAUREN HARRIS-KOJETIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., LONG-TERM CARE
PROVIDERS AND SERVICES USERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015–2016, at 19 (2019).
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residents are women. 28 Over forty-seven percent of LTC residents have a
diagnosis of dementia, forty-six percent have a diagnosis of depression, and
thirty-two percent have a diagnosis of diabetes. 29 Cumulative patterns of nonreferral decisions from LTC facilities can thus have disparate impacts based on
age, sex, and disability.
If disparate impact discrimination protections vary by the protected class in
question, some of these effects could be judged discriminatory on the part of
health care entities receiving federal funding, but others would not be. Can this
divergence be justified by different features of the categories of race, color,
national origin, sex, age, or disability, or by their historical treatment? If so, what
might it look like to implement different anti-discrimination rules in health care
for different groups of people? This Article explores whether categories (i.e.,
age, disability, race, and sex) legally and ethically warrant separate or universal
treatment from the perspective of achieving non-discrimination in health care.
That is, if we think it is wrong to adopt policies with the effect of deprioritizing
people for health care because of their race or sex, should we think that it is
similarly wrong to adopt policies with the effect of deprioritizing people for
health care on the basis of their age or disability? Or do the differences among
the statutes capture features of the categories that are of relevant legal or ethical
significance?
This Article begins the exploration of these difficult questions with a brief
overview of Section 1557 and what little can be gleaned from its legislative
history in Part II. This Article then describes several important differences
among the referenced statutes in Part III, followed by accounts of the conflicting
rulemakings and decisions in the case law in Part IV.
II. QUESTIONS REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1557 OF THE ACA
Section 1557 of the ACA consists of only two sentences. As described
briefly above, the first sentence states that individuals shall not “be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under” health programs or activities receiving federal funding “on the ground
prohibited under” the four referenced statutes. 30 The second sentence states that
the “enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI,
title IX, [Section 504], or such Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes
of violations of this subsection.” 31 Neither of these sentences resolve whether
Section 1557 adopts a uniform anti-discrimination standard, as explained in
what follows.
28. Ari Houser, Women & Long-Term Care, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (2007), https://assets
.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/fs77r_ltc.pdf.
29. LAUREN HARRIS-KOJETIN ET AL., supra note 27, at 23.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
31. Id.
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Ways of Reading the Text of Section 1557

The first sentence of Section 1557 prohibits discrimination in federally
funded health care on the “ground” prohibited in the four other statutes. 32
“Ground” is explicitly singular in this sentence. As such, it might mean each of
the categories: race, color, and national origin; sex; disability; or age. If so, it
would refer to the categories but not the substantive types of forbidden
discrimination in the four referenced statutes. Alternatively, “ground” might
mean the unique body of law that has developed for each of the four statutes
referenced.
The first interpretation would create a universal anti-discrimination standard
for all protected classes. This could be referred to as a “universal” interpretation
of the first sentence. The discrimination prohibited by Section 1557 would thus
apply in the same way whether the protected category was race, sex, disability,
or age. A less complete form of universal interpretation would apply Section
1557 in the same way to all categories for some legal issues but not for others.
The second interpretation of this sentence would simply bring the four
separate prohibitions of discrimination together in one location, with each
maintaining their separate case law doctrines and rules. This could be called a
“separate” interpretation of the first sentence. This separate interpretation may
violate the rule against surplusage, 33 a common precept of statutory
interpretation, as Title VI, Section 504, and the Age Act already prohibited
discrimination in federally funded health care in virtue of prohibiting
discrimination in federally funded programs or activities for the classes they
protected. 34 Thus, if Section 1557 merely incorporates the standards of prior
laws, it will be redundant and unnecessary for all categories but sex.
However, on the separate interpretation of the first sentence, the additional
function of Section 1557 for sex would be to bring the standards of nondiscrimination developed in the realm of education into health care. At a
minimum, this interpretation would raise questions about whether the law that
has developed for education is a good fit for the kinds of discrimination expected
in health care. Much of the litigation under Title IX has involved secondary
school and college sports, asking questions such as whether the athletic
opportunities for girls and boys are sufficiently equivalent in light of the
respective interests of boys and girls in playing sports. 35 Whether the approaches
found in such litigation should carry over to health care is, at best, questionable.
For example, would a health care system that offers special services for men’s
32. Id.
33. See Charlie D. Stewart, The Rhetorical Canons of Construction: New Textualism’s
Rhetoric Problem, 116 U. MICH. L. R. 1485, 1496 (2018).
34. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Legitimacy and Agency Implementation of Title IX, 43
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 301, 304–05 (2020).
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health (say, prostate cancer or male infertility care) but that does not offer
services specifically directed to women (say, breast cancer care or in vitro
fertilization) be now held to violate Section 1557? Is this question analogous to
whether a school discriminates if it offers baseball for boys but not fast pitch
softball for girls? 36 If a condition disproportionately affects men—as COVID19 may 37—would it be discrimination to prioritize men for a vaccine, or would
a facility need to consider whether to allocate a vaccine proportionately to the
desires of men and women to receive it?
The second sentence of Section 1557 presents additional interpretive
problems. This sentence states, “[t]he enforcement mechanisms provided for and
available under such title VI, title IX, section [504], or such Age Discrimination
Act shall apply for purposes of violations of this subsection.” 38 Of note, unlike
“ground” in the first sentence, “enforcement mechanisms” is plural. This could
suggest a separate interpretation of the second sentence: that people should use
the enforcement mechanism associated with the referenced statute (i.e. Title VI,
Title IX, Section 504, Age Act) for the category (i.e., race, color, national origin;
sex; disability; age) claimed as the basis of discrimination. Several courts have
adopted this separate interpretation of the enforcement sentence. 39 These courts
have reasoned in addition that this sentence functions to reinforce the separate
interpretation of the first sentence. 40
Alternatively, the second sentence might be given a universal interpretation
allowing any of the available enforcement mechanisms to apply to any of the
categories. A point in favor of this reading is that the sentence does not specify
that only the enforcement mechanism from a specific protected category or
statute shall be used for that category or statute. It simply says that “the
enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under…shall apply.” 41
Perhaps Congress meant for people complaining of discrimination on any of the
grounds to have the same enforcement mechanisms available to them. Many
anti-discrimination claimants assert that they have suffered discrimination based
on more than one of the categories; for example, people claiming age
discrimination may also claim disability discrimination. It could seem
36. See, e.g., Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2020)
(concluding that female high school athletes had not provided evidence to show a violation of Title
IX).
37. See Derek M. Griffith et al., Men and COVID-19: A Biopsychosocial Approach to
Understanding Sex Differences in Mortality and Recommendations for Practice and Policy
Interventions, PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, July 2020, at 1, 1–2, https://www.cdc.gov/pcd
/issues/2020/pdf/20_0247.pdf.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
39. E.g., Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 238–39 (6th Cir. 2019);
Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 982 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2020).
40. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d at 239; CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 982 F.3d at
1209.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
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problematic to be able to get different remedies depending on which category is
the ground of the claimed discrimination. The rule against surplusage is a further
argument in favor of the universal interpretation of the second sentence.
Otherwise, the second sentence adds nothing, and simply restates what the
enforcement mechanisms already are for each of the referenced statutes.
On the other hand, the idea that the second sentence of Section 1557 is meant
to permit any type of enforcement that would be allowed under any of the four
incorporated statutes has been roundly criticized by some courts. This universal
interpretation, courts have said, would make Section 1557 a “[pick] your own
adventure” from which plaintiffs may choose their favorite anti-discrimination
theories and methods to enforce them. 42 A further argument in favor of the
separate interpretation of the second sentence is that it is institutionally more
streamlined to defer to existing enforcement mechanisms when cases might
allege violations of both Section 1557 and the underlying statute. Someone
might, for example, claim discrimination under both Section 1557 and Title VI;
having different enforcement mechanisms for the two could create confusion
about which mechanism to use. It would be more streamlined to use the
enforcement mechanism for Title VI in suits claiming discrimination under both
Section 1557 and Title VI. Reasoning in this way, however, potentially creates
the problem mentioned in the preceding paragraph, of the availability of
different enforcement mechanisms depending on the category claimed. Just as it
might seem problematic for someone claiming discrimination on the basis of
race to get different remedies if they use Section 1557 than if they use Title VI,
it also might seem problematic for someone claiming discrimination on the basis
of race and age to receive different remedies depending on whether they prevail
on their claim of race discrimination or their claim of age discrimination. This
difference could seem especially troubling if the same set of facts give rise to a
successful claim of discrimination on the basis of both of the categories of race
and age. [Otherwise, people might be confused by the availability of different
enforcement processes when they claim violations of Section 1557 and, say,
discrimination on the basis of race under Title VI. In response, it could also be
pointed out that there is no obvious justification for someone claiming
discrimination on the basis of more than one category in the same case—say,
age and disability—to get different remedies depending on the category.]
Unfortunately, the legislative history does not answer these interpretive
questions for us. There is no record of discussion or debate on Section 1557,

42. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d at 239. A reply to this criticism could be
that Section 1557 was intended to permit claimants to select the anti-discrimination theory to use,
particularly if they were claiming discrimination on the basis of more than one category, such as
age and disability.
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which was part of the ACA from its initial introduction. 43 This could be due to
inartful drafting of Section 1557, for the ACA itself has many drafting issues. 44
Also, not surprisingly, the Obama administration and the Trump administration
have interpreted Section 1557 differently in successive rulemaking. 45 As
mentioned above, the Biden administration has indicated that it will review the
rulemaking changes introduced by the Trump administration.
B.

Different Administrations, Different Interpretative Rules

The Obama administration and the Trump administration took different
approaches to interpreting Section 1557. Here, we outline a few of those
important differences.
The Obama administration issued its final rule implementing Section 1557
in May 2016. 46 That rule contained three provisions relevant to our discussion.
First, it recognized disparate impact as a form of prohibited discrimination for
all categories. 47 Second, it stated that individuals in all of the protected
categories could bring private suits for disparate impact discrimination under
Section 1557. 48 Thus, it interpreted the second sentence of Section 1557 as
referring only to administrative processes of enforcement, such as the time
period within which claims must be brought, rather than to the remedies that
could be available, such as damages. 49
Finally, the four referenced statutes in Section 1557 contain explicit
exceptions to the anti-discrimination requirements they impose. 50 The Obama
administration rulemaking adopted these exceptions without change. 51 These
exceptions all concern entitlement benefits specifically limited by federal law.
43. We have searched the Bluebook database for “Section 1557,” Medicare, “age
discrimination,” and “discrimination.” References to “discrimination” are either to discrimination
in the insurance industry or to the need for people to be protected against discrimination on the
basis of sex. Full information about our search is on file with the authors.
44. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Four Words That Imperil Health Care Law Were All a Mistake,
Writers Now Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us
/politics/contested-words-in-affordable-care-act-may-have-been-left-by-mistake.html (discussing
“exchange established by a state”).
45. See infra Section II.B.
46. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31375 (May 18, 2016)
(codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
47. Id. at 31440.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(d) (2019) (creating an exception under Title VI for the exclusion of
non-qualifying individuals for Indian Health and Cuban Refugee Services); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(c)
(2019) (creating an exception under the Rehab Act for the exclusion of non-qualifying individuals
for benefits); 45 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2019) (creating an exception under the Age Act for age
consideration if reasonably necessary for the normal operation or achievement of the statutory
objective of a program).
51. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31470.
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For example, the Indian Health Service is established by statute, and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act states that having this program available to a limited group
is not prohibited discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. 52 Under
Section 504, benefits programs for people with specific disabilities, such as the
inclusion of people with end-stage renal disease in the Medicare program, are
not disability discrimination. 53 Similarly, that people must reach the age of
sixty-five to become eligible for Medicare is not Age Discrimination under the
Age Act. 54 The only additional referenced exception concerns age. Under
Section 1557, age may be used when it is needed for the normal operation of a
program or to achieve a program’s statutory objectives. 55
In incorporating these explicit exceptions in the four referenced statutes in
Section 1557, this rulemaking from the Obama administration recognized some
differences among Title VI, the Rehab Act, and the Age Act. 56 These differences
among exceptions in the underlying statutes might lend support for interpreting
Section 1557 as less than fully universal. Importantly, however, these
differences all involve benefits or programmatic objectives recognized by
statutes enacted by a general-purpose legislative body. 57 In these respects,
recognition of these differences in statutory exceptions might not provide
support for adopting a fully separate interpretation of Section 1557. Consider as
an example, standards for allocating crisis care during COVID-19. Some have
argued that disability and age are different, and that while it is a violation of
Section 1557 to allocate crisis care during COVID-19 based on disability, it may
not be a violation to allocate the same care based on age because older people
may have shorter life expectancies. 58 The interpretation of Section 1557 in the
Obama administration rule-making would require determining whether the life
expectancies of older people fall within a specific Age Act exception. However,
COVID-19 care crisis standards may have been adopted by non-legislative
advisory bodies, rather than being program objectives recognized by a general
purpose legislative body, and thus arguably would not be like the statutory
52. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(d) (2019).
53. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(c) (2019); 45 C.F.R. § 85.21(c) (2019).
54. 45 C.F.R. § 91.17 (2019).
55. 45 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2019) (creating the exception for age consideration if reasonably
necessary for the normal operation or achievement of the statutory objective of a program). See
also 45 C.F.R. § 91.12 (2019) (defining normal operation and statutory objective); 45 C.F.R. §
91.15 (2019) (stating the burden of proving an age distinction falls within the exception is on the
recipient); 45 C.F.R. § 91.18 (2019) (stating any age distinction contained in a rule or regulation
promulgated by HHS is presumed to qualify for the exception).
56. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 31376,
31378 (May 18, 2016) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 92).
57. See id.
58. See David Wasserman et al., Setting Priorities Fairly in Response to Covid-19: Identifying
Overlapping Consensus and Reasonable Disagreement, J. L. & BIOSCIENCES, June 28, 2020, at 1,
6 (2020).
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exceptions recognized in the Obama administration rule-making. 59 We return in
the final Part of this Article to whether these differences should matter to our
understanding of differentiating among the types of discrimination referenced in
Section 1557.
The Trump administration issued its final Section 1557 rule in June 2020. 60
The stated goal of this rulemaking was to eliminate unnecessary duplication,
redundancy, or confusion by instituting specific deference to each of the statutes
referenced in Section 1557. 61 As the agency explained:
[T]he final rule will defer to the relevant existing regulations and the relevant
case law with respect to each of the underlying civil rights statutes, as applied to
the health context under Section 1557. It will not create, as the 2016 Rule did, a
new patchwork regulatory framework unique to Section 1557 covered entities. 62

On disparate impact causes of action, the 2020 rule defers to the referenced
statutes. Stating the judgment that disparate impact suits are authorized by Title
VI and Section 504, but not by Title IX or the Age Act, the rulemaking states:
[T]he Department believes it is necessary to revert to the underlying statutes and
their implementing regulations. As a result, to the extent any of the underlying
statutes authorize disparate impact claims, this final rule will recognize such
claims by virtue of its reliance on the governing statutes, regulations, guidance
and case law applicable to such claims without needing to delineate the
availability or lack of availability of all possible claims in this final rule. 63

Finally, although the rule as proposed had planned to repeal the provision
authorizing private rights of action, the final rule took no position on this issue
for Section 1557. 64
III. IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES AMONG TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT,
TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS, SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT, AND THE AGE ACT
This section outlines several doctrinal differences that have developed for
the four statutes referenced in Section 1557, with the goal of deepening
understanding of the challenges presented in interpreting Section 1557, rather
than the goal of resolving the differences. Perhaps most striking is the earlier
59. See, e.g., COVID-19 Medical Rationing & Facility Visitation Policies, CTR. FOR PUB.
REPRESENTATION, https://www.centerforpublicrep.org/covid-19-medical-rationing/ (last updated
Mar. 31, 2021) (discussing how medical professionals developed protocols to ration care that
discriminated against people with disabilities).
60. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs and Activities, Delegation
of Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37160, 37160 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86, 92,
147, 155, and 156).
61. Id. at 37163.
62. Id. at 37162.
63. Id. at 37195.
64. Id. at 37203.
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observation that three of the statutes already prohibited discrimination in
federally funded health care—Title VI, Section 504, and the Age Act—whereas
the fourth, Title IX, prohibited discrimination in federally funded educational
programs on the basis of sex, but not in the health care arena. 65 Other differences
among the statutes have also developed through the case law, although these
lines of case law continue to generate controversy. This Article considers two
particularly important areas where the statutes may diverge: recognizing
disparate impact as a form of actionable discrimination and allowing individuals
to bring causes of action on their own behalf. 66
A.

Disparate Impact Discrimination

As highlighted above, disparate impact discrimination occurs when facially
neutral policies or practices have significantly different effects on people in
specified categories. 67 This type of discrimination may be proved through
statistical evidence showing that protected classes are negatively impacted in
ways that others are not, and the effects could be avoided by reasonable changes
in the harmful policies or practices. 68 Disparate impact discrimination was
formally recognized by the Supreme Court in an early decision interpreting the
employment discrimination section of the Civil Rights Act, Title VII. 69 This case
involved an apparently neutral rule—requiring employees to have a high school
diploma or pass an intelligence test—that had been adopted as a thinly-veiled
effort to avoid Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race. 70 In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court struck down the power company’s use of
these requirements as a condition of certain higher-status jobs in its generating
plant. 71 The employer had adopted the requirement after the enactment of Title
VII, without any validation of its need. 72 Instead, the motivation for its adoption
was apparently to keep Blacks from attaining non-custodial jobs in the plant. 73
As the Duke Power facts illustrate, recognition of disparate impact as a form
of discrimination may be critical when actors avoid explicitly mentioning
protected categories yet enact policies that function in similarly exclusionary

65. See supra Section II.A.
66. Other differences might also be important, but we set them aside for reasons of space.
67. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., 576 U.S. at 538, 543. See generally Title VI
Legal Manual, Section VII: Proving Discrimination – Disparate Impact, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6Manual7 (last visited June 11, 2021).
69. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
70. Id. at 425–26.
71. Id. at 425–26, 436. For the history of disparate impact discrimination, see generally Susan
D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251
(2011).
72. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
73. Id. at 426–27.
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ways. As employers became aware of their Title VII obligations, direct evidence
of intentional disparate treatment discrimination became increasingly rare. 74
Employment policies or decisions rarely mention the categories themselves,
making it necessary for claimants to prove that the employer acted with
animus. 75 However, employers can usually offer a reason for not hiring or firing
someone in a protected class, and it may be difficult to prove that the offered
reason was not the employer’s real motive. 76 This makes disparate impact claims
essential as they may reach beyond thinly veiled overt discrimination to
situations in which there are differential outcomes that could reasonably be
avoided. 77 Policies with such impacts may be the result of histories of implicit
bias or social inequality. 78
Because of this, disparate impact claims recognize the influence of structural
factors in ways that individualized disparate treatment analyses cannot. 79 They
can address many forms of systemic discrimination that might be unintentional
but no less harmful to protected classes. Policies with significantly different
impacts may have originated in the context of earlier injustices, while not being
directly linked to those injustices. For example, the federal tax policy of
permitting homeowners to sell their primary residence exempt from some capital
gains tax allows people to accumulate wealth from their homes. 80 However, this
facially race neutral policy has had a disparate impact over the years on
minorities who were unable to purchase homes in the first place due to
discriminatory redlining. 81 Still other policies are simply longstanding practices
that have never been examined in light of whether they are necessary or whether
their utility might be outweighed by the disadvantages they impose on others.
Here, an example might be the design of mammography machines to require
74. Jason R. Bent, The Telltale Sign of Discrimination: Probabilities, Information
Asymmetries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory, 44 UNIV. MICH. J. L. REFORM 797,
803–04 n.17 (2011).
75. See Laina Rose Reinsmith, Proving an Employer’s Intent: Disparate Treatment
Discrimination and the Stray Remarks Doctrine After Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 55
VAND. L. REV. 219, 225–26 (2002).
76. See id. at 232–33.
77. See Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis,
63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 258 (2011). But see Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 767–75 (arguing that disparate impact theory has proved
unsuccessful and created a misunderstanding of disparate treatment theory as solely about animus).
78. See Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The Civil Rights of Health: A New Approach to
Challenging Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L. REV. 758, 784 (2020).
79. See id. at 788; Dayna Bowen Matthew, Structural Inequality: The Real Covid-19 Threat
to America’s Health and How Strengthening the Affordable Care Act Can Help, 108 GEO. L.J.
1679, 1687–88 (2020).
80. See Topic No. 701 Sale of Your Home, IRS (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/tax
topics/tc701.
81. BRUCE MITCHELL & JUAN FRANCO, NCRC RSCH, HOLC “REDLINING” MAPS: THE
PERSISTENT STRUCTURE OF SEGREGATION AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 5 (2018).
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patients to stand and lean forward for optimal imaging. 82 Without modification,
this design renders mammography inaccessible for many patients with
disabilities who could not easily maintain a standing position. 83
Whether to recognize disparate impact as a form of discrimination, and what
standards to use in so doing, is legally and ethically contentious. Opponents of
disparate impact as a theory of discrimination argue that anti-discrimination law
should address individual, intentional acts of prejudice rather than social
inequalities or social structures more generally. 84 Opponents also question
whether current disparate impacts, even when correlated with historically
disfavored groups, are unjust. 85 Despite the importance of disparate impact
theory in addressing difficulties in proving covert discrimination, the Court has
increasingly suggested limiting the scope of claims of disparate impact
discrimination. 86 These limitations also have been a theme in rulemaking under
the Trump administration. 87
Significant complexities in understanding Section 1557, with respect to
disparate impact discrimination, have been created by the times when the
referenced statutes were adopted and interpreted by the Court. Title VI was
adopted in 1964, Title IX in 1972, the Rehab Act in 1973, and the Age Act in
1975. 88 Title VI, coming first, was in some respects the model for the later
statutes. 89 An early Supreme Court decision interpreting Title VI, handed down
in 1974, had suggested a broad scope for disparate impact theory under that
statute. 90 Seminal Supreme Court decisions then were handed down regarding
Title IX in 1979 91 and Section 504 in 1985. 92 In the background of these
decisions was the Court’s apparently broad reading of Title VI in 1974.
82. Lisa I. Iezzoni & Elizabeth Pendo, Accessibility of Medical Diagnostic Equipment —
Implications for People with Disability, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1371, 1372 (2018).
83. Id.
84. Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63
FLA. L. REV. 251, 254 (2011).
85. Justice Scalia raised this concern in his concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the
scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make
decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the
Court explains, discriminatory.”).
86. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S.
519, 525, 543, 544 (2015) (analyzing disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act).
87. See, e.g., HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85
Fed. Reg. 60288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6101 (2018).
89. E.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (“Title IX was patterned after
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”)
90. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568, 569 (1974).
91. See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677, 680.
92. See generally Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985).
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However, in 2001, the Court specifically limited the scope of disparate impact
discrimination for Title VI. 93 As discussed below, the implications of this
decision for the interpretation of the Rehab Act and Title IX are not fully
resolved. In what follows, this Article considers the status of disparate impact
theory under the four referenced statutes, with the aim of exploring what is at
stake in incorporating these different histories into Section 1557, or in choosing
to take a uniform approach to disparate impact under Section 1557.
1. Title VI
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, prohibiting discrimination
based on race, color, or national origin, simply reads: “No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 94 The Court has
interpreted Section 601 of Title VI to prohibit only intentional discrimination
based on race, color, or national origin. 95
However, Section 602 may give some scope for addressing disparate impact
discrimination under Section 1557, because Section 1557’s reference to Title VI
explicitly includes all of Title VI. 96 Under Section 602 of Title VI, federal
agencies have authority to issue rules implementing the objectives of Title VI
with the approval of the President. 97 The Court has assumed that agency rules
under Title VI may prohibit practices with disparate impacts, but it has also held
that there are no private rights of action to enforce these rules insofar as they
involve disparate impact discrimination, which will be discussed below. 98
For COVID-19 allocation decisions, the upshot of this legal assumption
governing Title VI would be that categorization on the basis of race is strictly
prohibited, whether intentional or not. This prohibition would apply even if the
categorization is intended to benefit someone based on race. Thus interpreted,
Title VI would prohibit any vaccine allocation programs that prioritize Blacks
or Hispanics, even if the prioritization is because of their higher mortality from
93. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281, 293 (2001).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2020).
95. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 275, 280, 303, 307 n. 14 (2001). This interpretation followed the
Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. An earlier decision involving a claim by nonEnglish-speaking Chinese students that the San Francisco school system’s policy of refusing
bilingual or remedial English instruction was discriminatory had seemed to countenance disparate
impact discrimination under § 601, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564–65 (1974). See generally S.
HSIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45665, CIVIL RIGHTS AT SCHOOL: AGENCY ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE
VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 7 (2019).
96. Section 1557 says “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.).”
42 U.S.C. 18116(a).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2020). An executive order has since delegated this approval
authority to the Attorney General. Exec. Order No. 12250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72995 (Nov. 2, 1980).
98. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 293.
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the virus. On the other hand, a completely neutral vaccine allocation policy that
failed to consider the disparate impact such policies might have on racial groups
especially hard-hit by the virus might be thought to have a discriminatory
disparate impact on these groups. This presents a conundrum.
The ultimate interpretation of Title VI for allocation policies that have
disparate impacts based on race, color, or national origin remains unclear, as the
Court has not ruled definitively on whether the Title VI regulations prohibiting
disparate impact provide a way to enforce the Title VI prohibition on disparate
treatment based on race. 99 An example of what might be considered disparate
impact discrimination based on race or color is the use of pulse oximetry
readings to decide whether someone’s oxygenation is sufficiently compromised
to require hospitalization for COVID-19. 100 Recent evidence suggests that
oximetry readings may give inflated results for people with darker skin and thus
result in inaccurate assessments and undertreatment of people of color. 101 A
program’s reliance on these oximetry readings for treatment decisions might
therefore be questioned as having a disparate impact on people of color. If the
Section 602 regulations are determined to properly interpret Title VI, this would
be prohibited disparate impact discrimination. If Title VI only prohibits
intentionally disparate treatment, it would not be covered by Title VI. If
disparate impact discrimination is prohibited under any of the other statutes
referenced in Section 1557, this would mean less robust protection against
discrimination based on race, color, or national origin than against
discrimination based on at least one of the other categories.
2. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Early interpretations of Section 504 permitted claims of disparate impact as
a form of discrimination based on disability. These interpretations, as noted
above, came at a time when it was thought that Section 601 of Title VI prohibited
disparate impact discrimination. In the leading case introducing disparate impact
theory under Section 504, Alexander v. Choate, people with disabilities
challenged a Tennessee Medicaid policy limiting hospital stays to fourteen days
annually. 102 Although the challengers lost the case, the ruling was based on the
Court’s determination that both disabled and non-disabled Medicaid recipients
had access to the same benefit—fourteen hospital days—rather than on rejection

99. Alexander ruled only on whether there is a private right of action to enforce §2000d-1, 532
U.S. at 279 (“We do not inquire here whether the DOJ regulation was authorized by § 602 . . . .”).
100. Sonia Shah et al., Novel Use of Home Pulse Oximetry Monitoring in COVID-19 Patients
Discharged from the Emergency Department Identifies Need for Hospitalization, 27 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 681, 682 (2020).
101. Michael W. Sjoding et al., Letter to the Editor: Racial Bias in Pulse Oximetry
Measurement, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2477, 2478 (2020).
102. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985).
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of disparate impact as a potential form of discrimination under Section 504. 103
This decision in Alexander v. Choate predates, by over fifteen years, the
determination that parallel language in Title VI does not encompassing disparate
impact discrimination. 104 Later interpretations of Section 504 are less clear on
whether it includes disparate impact as a form of prohibited discrimination.
Some subsequent court decisions have understood Alexander v. Choate to mean
that disparate impact discrimination is addressed under Section 504 as the failure
to provide “meaningful access” to the federally funded program at issue. 105 In
contrast, other courts have questioned reading Section 504 to permit disparate
impact discrimination in the context of cases discussing the interpretation of
Section 1557. 106 The Trump administration Section 1557 rulemaking also
opined that Section 504 does not encompass disparate impact discrimination. 107
Whether Section 504 applies to disparate impact discrimination has
important implications for policies adopted during COVID-19. Many COVID19 allocation decisions can be anticipated to have differential impacts on people
with disabilities. Initial crisis standards of care singled out specified disabilities
for deprioritization, such as neuromuscular diseases and conditions with
respiratory complications like cystic fibrosis. 108 These standards were
considered discriminatory by the Office for Civil Rights at HHS. 109 As they refer
specifically to disabilities, they would be considered discriminatory disparate
treatment. However, protocols now in effect in various states rely on
physiological measures judged to be predictive of the likely impact of therapy
based on the best available evidence. 110 Whether these standards are also
discriminatory because of the likelihood that they will have a disparate impact
on people with disabilities remains contested. 111 Answering this question under
disability anti-discrimination law depends on whether Section 504 is judged to
prohibit disparate impact discrimination and, if so, what forms this might take.

103. Id. at 309.
104. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280, 285 (2001).
105. Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 982 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2020).
106. See, e.g., Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 2019).
107. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of
Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37160, 37195, 37202 (June 19, 2020).
108. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., OCR Resolves Complaint with
Utah After it Revised Crisis Standards of Care to Protect Against Age and Disability Discrimination
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/08/20/ocr-resolves-complaint-with-utahafter-revised-crisis-standards-of-care-to-protect-against-age-disability-discrimination.html
[hereinafter OCR Resolves Complaint].
109. Id.
110. E.g., STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STANDARDS OF CRISIS CARE GUIDELINES 5 (Nov. 12, 2020).
111. See, e.g., Ari Ne’eman, When It Comes to Rationing, Disability Rights Law Prohibits More
Than Prejudice, THE HASTINGS CTR. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/when-itcomes-to-rationing-disability-rights-law-prohibits-more-than-prejudice/.
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3. Title IX of the Education Amendments
Title IX, prohibiting discrimination based on sex, was modeled after Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act. 112 Court decisions typically treat Title IX as
analogous to Title VI with respect to disparate treatment discrimination. 113 The
Court decision regarding private rights of action under Title IX involved a
challenge to medical school admission policies that deprioritized or
automatically rejected older applicants, but did not reach the issue of whether
such policies with a disparate impact on women applicants were prohibited
disparate impact discrimination. 114 Just as for Title VI, it is disputed whether the
non-discrimination provision of Title IX may be interpreted to prohibit disparate
impact discrimination. The Trump administration rulemaking for Section 1557
stated explicitly that Title IX does not cover disparate impact discrimination. 115
Court decisions have also rejected the contention that Title IX addresses
disparate impact discrimination, holding that Section 1557 by reference to Title
IX does not address disparate impact discrimination on the basis of sex. 116 Other
courts seem to assume that Title IX does permit recognizing disparate impact as
a form of discrimination, although it does not allow individuals to sue for money
damages on this theory. 117
By referencing Title IX, Section 1557 incorporates a statute into the realm
of health care that was designed for, and has been interpreted in, the realm of
education. 118 There may be problems with whether the forms discrimination
takes in education resemble the forms that it takes in health care. Many of the
court decisions interpreting Title IX involve school or college athletic
programs. 119 These decisions apply standards developed under regulations to
determine whether programs are adequately accommodating of the respective
112. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
113. Id. at 696 n.19.
114. Id. at 680 n.2.
115. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of
Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37160, 37196 (June 19, 2020).
116. See, e.g., Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 2019).
117. See, e.g., Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 2020). Title
IX regulations also prohibit actions that constitute disparate impact discrimination, although the
Court has not explicitly upheld these regulations. An example is the use of admissions criteria with
a “disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of sex unless the use of such test or
criterion is shown to predict validly success in the education program or activity in question and
alternative tests or criteria which do not have such a disproportionately adverse effect are shown to
be unavailable.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(b)(2) (2020).
118. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2020); see also Nondiscrimination in Health and Health
Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. at 37207.
119. See, e.g., Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats
Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA, &
ENT. L.J. 551, 561 (2003) (“Title IX has become synonymous with expanding participation
opportunities for female student-athletes.”).
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levels of interest of girls and boys in playing sports. 120 Whether standards based
on levels of interest in this way are appropriate to health care is questionable,
given ethical obligations to do patient education and outreach; obligations that
do not exist for sports. For example, suppose the levels of interests of men in
receiving a therapy were much higher than the levels of women in receiving the
same therapy, but the evidence indicated that the therapy was as effective in
women as in men. It seems unlikely that it would be judged non-discriminatory
to allocate a greater proportion of the therapy to men.
4. The Age Act
The Age Act has explicit provisions about disparate treatment and disparate
impact that are not found in the other three statutes. This raises questions about
whether age discrimination is different in kind from discrimination against
people falling into other protected categories. As for disparate treatment, the Age
Act specifically states that it does not apply to programs or activities established
under law to provide benefits or assistance based on age, or which establish
criteria for participation in age-related terms. 121 Federal or state statutes, such as
Medicare, that provide health benefits based on age are examples. Under the
Age Act regulations, these programs must be in federal, state, or local statutes
or ordinances “adopted by an elected, general purpose legislative body.” 122
Otherwise, these programs would not be protected by this safe harbor and could
be found to constitute disparate treatment discrimination. Crisis standards of
care committees composed to address shortages during a pandemic, such as
those found in many states for influenza and COVID-19 planning, would not
meet this standard of a general-purpose legislative body. 123
The Age Act further states that it is not violated if a program acts in a way
that “reasonably takes into account age as a factor necessary to the normal
operation or the achievement of any statutory objective of such program or
activity; or the differentiation made by such action is based upon reasonable
factors other than age.” 124 Reasonably taking age into account means that at least
120. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2020) (“In determining whether equal opportunities are
available, the Director will consider, among other factors . . . [w]hether the selection of sports and
levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of both sexes . . . .”). See,
e.g., Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 768 F.3d 843, 855 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying
effective accommodation of interests standard).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2018).
122. 45 C.F.R. § 91.3(b)(1) (2020). The legislative history of the Age Act makes clear that
Congress was referring to benefit programs with age-related eligibility criteria. 121 CONG. REC.
9212 (1975).
123. See, e.g., UTAH HOSP. ASS’N CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE WORKGROUP, UTAH CRISIS
STANDARDS OF CARE GUIDELINES 3 (Nov. 12, 2020) (listing membership of Utah Hospital
Association Crisis Standards of Care Workgroup).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2020). This provision was added to the legislation
explicitly to take reasonableness into account. See H.R. 1230, 116th Cong. (2019).
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some additional forms of disparate treatment based on age are regarded as nondiscriminatory if they are necessary to achieve statutory objectives. For COVID19, a vaccination program that aims to protect those most likely to become
seriously ill might take age into account, if evidence shows that people over a
given age are at a significantly elevated mortality risk, protecting those at highest
risk of serious illness is a statutory objective of the vaccination program, and
vaccinating the elderly is necessary to achieve this protection. Likewise, a
statutory objective of ensuring vaccine safety would allow setting a minimum
age threshold if the evidence is as yet insufficient to demonstrate that a vaccine
is safe in younger children.
The use of “reasonable factors other than age” permits policies that, if
reasonable, might also disproportionately affect the elderly. That is, it permits
some policies with disparate impact on the elderly, if necessary to achieve the
stated policy goal. For example, a policy requiring visual acuity in order to drive
would be permissible if it were considered necessary for public safety. However,
the Age Act regulations further clarify that “an action may be based on a factor
other than age only if the factor bears a direct and substantial relationship to the
normal operation of the program or activity or to the achievement of a statutory
objective.” 125 A driver licensing requirement that required the ability to walk or
run a mile in twelve minutes or less would likely have a disparate impact on the
elderly, and it would be discriminatory under the regulation unless it could be
shown to bear a direct and substantial relationship to the furtherance of driving
safety. A similar requirement for public safety officers might not be considered
discriminatory, if it bore a direct relationship to the officers’ job responsibilities.
In health care, factors such as renal function might be relevant to the statutory
objectives for organ allocation, for example, but taking renal function into
account might have a disparate impact on persons who are older if age is
correlated with differences in renal function. 126 Determining whether these
impacts are discriminatory is a challenge, and critical to understanding whether
age is or should be different than the other categories referenced in Section 1557.
B.

Private Rights of Action

As described above, the second sentence of Section 1557 states that “the
enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI, title IX,
section [504], or such Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of
125. 34 C.F.R. § 110.13 (2020).
126. See Roy D. Bloom, Kidney Function and Non-Kidney Solid Organ Transplantation,
https://www.uptodate.com/contents/kidney-function-and-non-kidney-solid-organUPTODATE,
transplantation/print (last updated Nov. 9, 2018) (describing how kidney function is part of
preoperative evaluation prior to non-kidney solid organ transplantation). See, e.g., A. Clara Drenthvan Maanen et al., Renal Function Assessment in Older Adults, 76 BJCP 616, 617 (2013)
(discussing the fact that older adults are more vulnerable to adverse drug reactions due to an
increased prevalence of kidney function impairment).
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violations of this subsection.” 127 Understanding this sentence depends on
understanding what is meant by “enforcement mechanisms” and how the
relevant provisions of the four referenced statutes have been interpreted to differ.
These mechanisms might include who may pursue enforcement, what
procedures must be used, and what remedies are available for violations. One
particularly contested question is whether enforcement mechanisms include
what are called private rights of action. 128
Private rights of action enable private individuals to bring suit to enforce
their rights under a statute. 129 They reflect determinations that statutes are
designed to provide individuals with rights and remedies. 130 Sometimes a statute
explicitly permits private rights of action and damage remedies for individuals;
courts have also determined that the right is implied in some circumstances. 131
Without private rights of action, individuals must rely on the federal
government, or other designated entities, for enforcement. 132 But even the
federal government’s enforcement capabilities are limited, especially when the
statute does not provide for damages for individuals. When the federal
government believes that a state program such as Medicaid is out of compliance,
the ultimate remedy is to withhold federal funding for the program from the
state. 133 This is a drastic and overly broad remedy to ensure state compliance

127. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
128. Other questions include the processes they must use and the remedies they may receive.
See, e.g., Palacios v. MedStar Health, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 87, 91 (D.D.C. 2018) (considering statute
of limitations).
129. For a discussion of standards used by courts to determine whether to imply private rights
of action under a statute, see Caroline Bermeo Newcombe, Implied Private Rights of Action:
Definition, and Factors to Determine Whether a Private Action Will Be Implied from a Federal
Statute, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 117, 120 (2017). Newcombe argues that statutes enacted under the
spending clause—such as the statutes under consideration here—are unlikely to be found to imply
private rights of action. Id. at 126.
130. See id. at 120 n.9.
131. See id. In the background is that as the Court has become increasingly conservative, its
decisions have insisted on explicit statutory authorization or clear recognition of individual rights
under the statute in order to allow private rights of action. For example, in Armstrong v. Exceptional
Child Center, Inc., the Court held that the section of the Medicaid statute requiring states to set
reimbursement levels for providers at a point sufficient to ensure availability of services
comparable to that available to others in the community could not be enforced by private
individuals, 575 U.S. 320, 331–32 (2015). The statute at issue was § 20 of the Medicaid Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2020), which provides for payment “sufficient to enlist enough
providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care
and services are available to the general population in the geographic area.”
132. See generally Section IX- Private Right of Action & Individual Relief Through Agency
Action, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6Manual9 (last updated Feb. 3,
2021).
133. Conditional Grants-in-Aid., LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution
-conan/article-1/section-8/clause-1/conditional-grants-in-aid (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
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with statutory standards. 134 If Medicaid funds are withheld, the entire Medicaid
population may suffer. By contrast, when the funding goes to federal contractors,
the consequences of enforcement may be less widespread public harm. The harm
of the ultimate remedy of contract termination or debarment from government
contracts will fall most directly on the contractor, 135 but there may also be
indirect harms if the contractor was serving members of the public. Additionally,
if the actors charged with enforcing these rights are not politically motivated to
do so, this leaves injured parties without legal redress. 136
The upshot of a failure to recognize private rights of action is that individuals
who are concerned that they have been subjected to discrimination would not be
able to bring suit on their own behalf. 137 Without a private right of action, an
individual would be unable to go to court to obtain an order for the funding
agency to require changes in funded programs. 138 So too, would they be unable
to obtain an injunction to confront agency approval of state pandemic crisis
standards that discriminate on the basis of the protected categories of Section
1557. Instead, they would be dependent on the federal funding agency to take
action against the state, as HHS did with crisis plans that allegedly discriminated
on the basis of disability or age. 139 Nor would individuals who suffer personal
harm be able to sue for damages. 140 Each of the four statutes referenced in
Section 1557 has a complex history with respect to the recognition of private
rights of action. These complex histories are intertwined with whether disparate
impact is recognized as a form of discrimination under each of the referenced
statutes.
1. Title VI
The Supreme Court’s initial decision involving private rights of action under
Title VI appeared to signal that individuals could bring suit for violations of both
134. See Spending for the General Welfare, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu
/constitution-conan/article-1/section-8/clause-1/spending-for-the-general-welfare (last visited Feb.
25, 2021).
135. See Federal Contract Compliance Manual: 8A01 Remedies, OFF. OF FED. CONT.
COMPLIANCE, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ofccp/manual/fccm/chapter-8-resolution-noncompli
ance/8a-introduction (last updated Dec. 23, 2019).
136. See Newcombe, supra note 129, at 132.
137. Christine H. Monahan, Private Enforcement of the Affordable Care Act: Toward an
“Implied Warranty of Legality” in Health Insurance, 126 YALE L.J. 1118, 1123 (2017) (arguing
for implied private rights of action under state insurance law). See also Newcombe, supra note 129,
at 131.
138. See Monahan, supra note 137, at 1124, 1139.
139. E.g., OCR Resolves Complaint, supra note 108 (noting that this was the seventh such
complaint resolved by OCR).
140. Amitabh Chandra et al., Challenges to Reducing Discrimination and Health Inequity
Through Existing Civil Rights Laws, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 1041, 1044 (2017), https://www.health
affairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1091.
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Section 601 and Section 602. 141 To recall, Section 601 prohibits discrimination
on the ground of race, color or nation origin, while Section 602 grants the
authority to issue regulations enforcing Section 601. 142 Twenty-six years later,
the Court explicitly rejected private rights of action under Section 602. 143 In this
decision, however, the Court did not determine whether the Section 602
regulations addressing disparate impact as a form of discrimination could stand.
The result is that the regulations under Section 602 prohibit disparate impact
discrimination, but individuals may not bring private suits to enforce these
regulations.
2. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Private rights of action are permitted under Section 504 at least for
allegations of disparate treatment. Section 504 states specifically that the
remedies of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act are to be available to any person
aggrieved by any recipient of federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 144 This
has been the case from the very first decision under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. 145 The availability of private rights of action under Section
504 for disparate impact has been assumed, 146 but this has been disputed by
some courts recently interpreting Section 1557. 147
3. Title IX
Title IX has been held to imply private rights of action. 148 The leading case,
Cannon v. University of Chicago, involved a female applicant to medical schools
who alleged she was denied admission on the basis of her sex. 149 Cannon was a

141. This signal came from a 1974 decision, which recognized a challenge by Chineselanguage speaking school children in San Francisco against the school district’s failure to provide
them with supplemental instruction. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564, 568–69 (1974).
142. Supra Section III.A.1.
143. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). The case involved a state’s
administration of driver’s license tests in English only. The Court stated as given that Title VI
Section 601 permits individuals to sue for both injunctive relief and damages when they allege
discriminatory treatment on the basis of race, color, or national origin, and that Section 601 extends
only to such intentional discrimination. Id. at 281.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).
145. See Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 402, 405 (1979) (permitting a disabled
person’s claim against a federally funded college to proceed under Section 504 in a case of first
impression).
146. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985).
147. Compare Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 242 (6th Cir. 2019)
(holding that individuals cannot recover under a disparate impact theory as applied to the
Rehabilitation Act), with Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 982 F.3d 1204, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2020)
(explaining that a disparate impact claim may be brought based on lack of meaningful access).
148. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
149. Id. at 680.
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thirty-nine-year-old woman who contended that although her academic
credentials were similar to those of admitted students, she had been disfavored
by policies disqualifying older students for admission and that such policies
adversely affected women who were more likely to experience interruptions in
their educations. 150 Lower courts had dismissed her suit on the ground that Title
IX did not grant a private right of action. 151 The Court, however, construed Title
IX as granting an implied private right of action, noting that it had been modeled
on Title VI. 152 In 1972, when Title IX was passed, many federal courts of appeals
had already held that Title VI permitted a private right of action; this was the
context in which Congress had enacted Title IX. 153 In addition, the package of
statutes that included Title IX authorized attorney fees for private individuals
claiming violations of Title IX in public education, thereby implying the
anticipation of private rights of action. 154 According to the Court, Congress
wanted both “to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices” and to “provide individual citizens effective protection against those
practices.” 155
4. Age Discrimination Act
Both federal enforcement and private rights of action for injunctive disparate
impact relief are permitted under the Age Act. The relevant Age Act provision
reads: “When any interested person brings an action in any United States district
court . . . to enjoin a violation of this act by any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . .” 156 Thus the Age Act explicitly recognizes
private rights of action. An example of such individual action under the Age Act
was the unsuccessful effort by older residents of the western part of Contra Costa
County to challenge closure of a hospital in their area that received federal
funds. 157 The residents contended that the closure was discriminatory because
of its impact on the poor, African-American, and elderly who made up a
disproportionate share of the residents in this portion of the county. 158 The court
found that they were unlikely to succeed in their suit and thus could not obtain
a preliminary injunction against the closure because the explanation for the
closure was the failure to pass a parcel tax measure needed to raise funds for the
150. Id. at 680 n.2.
151. Id. at 683.
152. Id. at 703, 717.
153. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696.
154. Id. at 699.
155. Id. at 704.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e) (2020) (“When any interested person brings an action . . . to enjoin a
violation of this Act . . . .”).
157. DMC Closure Aversion Committee v. Goia, No. 14–cv–03636–WHO, 2014 WL 4446831,
at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (not reported).
158. Id. at *1.
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hospital. 159 Even so, the court recognized the availability of injunctive relief in
cases like these.
IV. ARE THE CATEGORIES NORMATIVELY DIFFERENT?
The preceding sections have outlined two important differences among the
four statutes brought together in Section 1557. The following table summarizes
these differences.
SELECTED DIFFERENCES IN THE STATUTES REFERENCED BY SECTION 1557
Statute

Disparate Impact?

Implied Private Right?

Title VI (race, color,
national origin)

No under § 601; yes
under § 602
regulations; unclear
whether these
regulations will stand

Yes under § 601; no
under § 602

Rehab Act (disability)

Assumed in Alexander
v. Choate; currently
disputed

Yes

Title IX (sex)

Disputed

Yes

Age Act (age)

Not discriminatory to
use “reasonable
factors other than age”
to achieve statutory
objectives or normal
operation of a program

Explicit private right
to sue; no need to
imply a private right

The puzzle we have presented in this Article is whether these differences
should be replicated in the interpretation of Section 1557. This interpretive
ambiguity in Section 1557 is more than just an academic puzzle. It reveals
deeper normative questions that demand scrutiny. To motivate this, consider the
following scenario: Anette, Theresa, Susan, and Gill are all eagerly awaiting
access to a COVID-19 vaccine. What factors should (or shouldn’t) be used when
deciding whom to prioritize? The fact that Anette is Black while the other three
people are White (Black patients have higher COVID-19 mortality than White
patients 160)? The fact that Theresa has diabetes while the other three don’t
(patients with diabetes have higher COVID-19 mortality than patients without

159. Id.
160. The COVID Racial Data Tracker, THE ATLANTIC, https://covidtracking.com/race (last
visited Feb. 23, 2021).
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diabetes 161)? The fact that Susan is eighty-five while the other three individuals
are in their forties (older patients have higher COVID-19 mortality than younger
patients 162)? The fact that Gill is male while the other three are female (males
have higher COVID-19 mortality than females 163)? Is one of these factors more
(or less) legitimate for basing a prioritization decision than the others? Should
we avoid considering any of the factors? Should we consider all four factors and
just look to the epidemiological evidence to determine who is most at risk in this
particular scenario? Does it matter what specific types of historical
discrimination the anti-discrimination statutes were developed to correct, and
which types are most exacerbated by COVID-19 or lack of vaccine access?
Our purpose is not to offer a normative account that definitively answers
these questions. We are incapable of doing so for two reasons. First, it would
require selecting one distributive justice theory as “best,” which is far beyond
the scope of this Article. Second, precisely because Black people, women, older
adults, and people with disabilities have experienced different and complex
histories of discrimination in health care, 164 members of each of these groups
could be legitimately prioritized based on multiple theories of equity, corrective
justice, and need.
But even more important to our thesis is that we also cannot turn to antidiscrimination law for guidance in answering these questions. Far from
providing a meta-framework for coordinating the diverse legal requirements of
the four anti-discrimination statutes it references, Section 1557 of the ACA
instead raises even more questions. The legal ambiguity in its interpretation
challenges the very idea of using individual categories to address widespread
discrimination. 165
161. Matthew C. Riddle et al., COVID-19 in People with Diabetes: Urgently Needed Lessons
from Early Reports, 43 DIABETES CARE 1378, 1378 (2020).
162. Id.
163. The COVID-19 Sex-Disaggregated Data Tracker, THE SEX, GENDER, & COVID-19
PROJECT (Feb. 22, 2021), https://globalhealth5050.org/the-sex-gender-and-covid-19-project/thedata-tracker/?explore=country&country=USA#search.
164. See, e.g., Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers, Bringing Age Discrimination and Disability
Discrimination Together: Too Few Intersections, Too Many Interstices, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S
ADVISOR 139, 140, 148–49 ( 2009) (exploring differences and similarities between discrimination
based on age, disability, sex, and race); Stephanie E. Rogers et al., Discrimination in Healthcare
Settings Is Associated with Disability in Older Adults: Health and Retirement Study 2008-2012, 30
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1413, 1417 (discussing the commonplace issue of age discrimination in
health care settings, as one in five adults over the age of fifty experience it); SCOTT BURIS ET AL.,
ACCESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, at 247 (2020) (noting the history of health
disparities experienced by those who are disabled).
165. See Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section1557/index.html (discussing how Section 1557 is an amalgamation of four longstanding antidiscrimination laws, and the interpretation of it remains unclear as various final rules are disputed
in court).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

SHOULD WE DISCRIMINATE AMONG DISCRIMINATIONS?

387

As a threshold point, this approach leads to legal protections only for those
groups who have overcome collective action problems and gained sufficient
political power to have their concerns addressed through legislation. 166 This
leaves behind many groups that experience widespread discrimination in health
care, such as the poor, the undocumented, and the unhoused. 167 Second, and
more important to our inquiry, the separate development of case law and
remedies in the four anti-discrimination statutes leads to competition between
vulnerable groups and the essentializing of protected classes. 168
Given the different legal remedies available to them based upon the statute
under which they typically sue, this itself generates disparities. Without private
rights of action and disparate impact claims, some groups will struggle much
more than others to tackle systemic discrimination. 169 Importantly, reliance on
protected categories can also lead to vulnerable groups and their advocacy
organizations being pitted against one another when lobbying for important
concerns like prioritizing vaccine distribution during a pandemic. 170 For
example, disability groups might be placed in a position to need to fight against
policies that are meant to counter ageism, or racial justice groups might need to
fight against policies that dilute their cause. This presents challenges to
developing overarching anti-discrimination policies that do not result in one
marginalized group succeeding at the expense of another.
Additionally, the fractured use of different anti-discrimination statutes may
inadvertently essentialize the protected categories of race, sex, disability, and
166. See, e.g., Maura Calsyn et al., For the Insurance Lobby, Old Habits Are Hard to Break,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 15, 2017, 1:10 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues
/healthcare/news/2017/02/15/415237/for-the-insurance-lobby-old-habits-are-hard-to-break/
(discussing how policymakers were successfully encouraged to include protections for transgender
people’s care and coverage in the ACA).
167. See Aprill Z. Dawson et al., Relationship Between Social Determinants of Health and
Systolic Blood Pressure in United States Immigrants, INT’L J. CARDIOLOGY HYPERTENSION, Aug.
2019, at 1, 2 (noting that life course socioeconomic status, immigrant status, and homelessness
history can all act as social determinants of health, leading to disparate health outcomes in affected
individuals).
168. See MaryBeth Musumeci et al., The Trump Administration’s Final Rule on Section 1557
Non-Discrimination Regulations Under the ACA and Current Status, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept.
18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/the-trump-administra
tions-final-rule-on-section-1557-non-discrimination-regulations-under-the-aca-and-current-status/
(detailing that federal courts have awarded relief under Section 1557 based on one of the four
comprising statutes itself and this, combined with administrative changes to Section 1557’s
interpretation, can lead to the inconsistent protections for many groups, such as those who are
transgender, those seeking abortions, and those with limited English proficiency).
169. See MARIE MERCAT-BRUNS, DISCRIMINATION AT WORK 92 (2016); Musumeci et al.,
supra note 168.
170. E.g., Isaac Stanley-Becker & Lena H. Sun, Covid-19 Is Devastating Communities of
Color. Can Vaccines Counter Racial Inequity?, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/12/18/covid-vaccine-racial-equity/.
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age. Despite remarkable differences among individuals, a poor Black woman
with asthma may just be treated as “Black,” a mother with an immunecompromised child who is uninsured as “female,” and an active, healthy
seventy-five-year-old man as simply “old.” The protected classes create
important legal entitlements, but the way they are operationalized may lead to
reducing individuals to features of their personality that ignore
intersectionalities, unique personal histories, and other important clinical
factors.
Finally, many different considerations must come into play when
considering whether the categories protected from discrimination under Section
1557 do or should protect from discrimination in the same ways. Some health
care programs provide funding benefits. 171 Others impose burdens or may
exclude people from access to care, as crisis care standards might do in the
circumstances in which they are invoked. 172 Some forms of health care such as
donated organs may be ineluctably scarce, others such as intensive care unit beds
may be expanded in dire circumstances, and still others such as funding may
require reallocation of resources. 173 As for the categories, some such as
disability will have fluctuating membership, others such as age occur to
everyone over the life cycle, and still others such as national origin are
immutable. 174 Definitions of some of the categories, such as race, disability, and
sex, are contested with social, personal, and biological components. 175 Different
histories and experiences of discrimination attend the categories too, as do
differences in social structures. 176

171. See generally What Marketplace Health Insurance Plans Cover, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/what-marketplace-plans-cover/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
172. See Catherine L. Auriemma et al., Eliminating Categorical Exclusion Criteria in Crisis
Standards of Care Frameworks, AM. J. BIOETHICS, 2020, at 28, 31.
173. See Steep Decline in Organ Transplants Amid COVID-19 Outbreak, PENN MED. NEWS
(May 12, 2020), https://www.pennmedicine.org/news/news-releases/2020/may/steep-decline-inorgan-transplants-amid-covid19-outbreak; How to Increase Hospital Bed Capacity by 20-30
Percent, GE HEALTHCARE (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.gehealthcare.com/article/how-to-increasehospital-bed-capacity-by-20-30-percent; Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Resource Allocation in
Healthcare: Implications of Models of Medicine as a Profession, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. (2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1925021/.
174. See Disability Statistics in the United States, BUREAU OF INTERNET ACCESSIBILITY (Nov.
29, 2018), https://www.boia.org/blog/disability-statistics-in-the-united-states; Eight Demographic
Trends Transforming America’s Older Population, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Nov. 12,
2018), https://www.prb.org/eight-demographic-trends-transforming-americas-older-population/;
Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1483, 1508 (2011).
175. Helen Meekosha, What the Hell Are You? An Intercategorical Analysis of Race, Ethnicity,
Gender, and Disability in the Australian Body Politic, 8 SCANDINAVIAN J. DISABILITY RSCH. 161,
172 (2006).
176. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 19 (2018).
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The pertinent question raised by the interpretation of Section 1557 is
whether such differences should shape protections against discrimination in
health care. For example, should we say that protections against racial
discrimination must be more robust than protections against age discrimination
because only some members of society bear the burdens of racism, while
everyone has the potential to live long enough to bear the burdens of ageism?
Or should we say that protections against age discrimination must be less robust
than protections against sex discrimination because women bear the burdens of
exposure to sexism across a lifetime, while ageism only plays out for a portion
of it?
We do not think so. There are, of course, meaningful differences between
types of discrimination and even different degrees of exposure to discrimination.
But we reject pitting one type of discrimination against another because
discrimination by its very nature is wrong regardless of the type or degree. The
person with a recent spinal cord injury who must now navigate the world with a
wheelchair does not experience “discrimination-lite” compared to someone born
with achondroplasia, just because she has not been exposed to discrimination for
as long. Likewise, an older patient in a long-term care facility who is not
transferred to a hospital despite suffering from symptoms of COVID-19 and a
Black man who suffers from a severe case of COVID-19 due to having his
diabetes ignored both bear the burdens of harms associated with being a member
of a marginalized group. The fact that the older patient’s variant of
discrimination only came later in life should not imply that it is ethically or
legally more tolerable.
There are certainly normative arguments for discriminating among
discriminations. One could advocate for prioritization of vaccine access based
on either race, sex, disability, or age, or some combination of these. The groups
chosen for prioritization might in turn reflect the outcome that we think most
unacceptable—the exacerbation of historical inequities, the creation of new
disparate impacts, increased population mortality, or increased transmission of
COVID-19. Preventing any of these outcomes would be a worthy goal.
However, it is beyond the scope of this Article to identify which outcome would
be most deplorable, and then advocate for a policy that mitigates it.
In this Article, we merely seek to highlight uncertainties regarding the
current interpretation of Section 1557 of the ACA. These uncertainties have realworld consequences, as some forms of discrimination might be allowed, some
might provide private rights of action, and some might require proof of disparate
treatment rather than impact. There are many thorny ethical and legal questions
that must be addressed in any policy that prioritizes one group’s health at the
expense of others. 177 Unfortunately, the existing case law interpreting Section
1557 of the ACA does not answer many of these normative questions for us.
177. See generally Brown, Francis, & Tabery, supra note 25, at 13–15.
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